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Abstract 
Using stock price reactions to sudden deaths of top executives as a measure of expected 
contribution to shareholder value, we examine the relationship between executive pay and 
managerial contribution to shareholder value. We find, first, that the managerial labor market is 
characterized by positive sorting: managers with high perceived contributions to shareholder 
value obtain higher pay. The executive pay-contribution relationship is stronger for professional 
executives and for executives with high compensation. We estimate, second, that an average top 
executive (CEO) appears to retain 71% (65%) of the marginal rent from the firm-manager 
relationship. We examine, third, how the executive pay-contribution relationship varies with 
individual, firm, and industry characteristics. Overall, our results are informative for the ongoing 
discussion about the level of executive compensation. 
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Few topics in financial economics rival executive compensation in the degree of interest 
they elicit from academia, media, policymakers, and the general public. Is executive pay related to 
executives’ contribution to firm value? Are CEOs’ contributions to shareholder value sufficient 
to offset their pay? Despite a rich literature on the subject, these important questions remain 
open avenues for research. Using the stock price reaction to sudden deaths as a measure of 
expected contribution to shareholder value, this paper examines the relationship between 
executive pay and contribution to shareholder value. We find that managers with high perceived 
contributions to shareholder value obtain higher pay. We estimate that top executives (CEOs) 
retain 71% (65%) of the marginal rent from the firm-manager relationship. 
Theories of wage determination commonly suggest that the level of pay is set by a 
bargaining process between the manager and the firm. The equilibrium pay level must satisfy 
both parties' participation constraints and allow a split of quasi-rents according to the relative 
bargaining power of the participants (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; 
Rosen, 1992).  
In the growing literature on executive compensation, surprisingly, few studies have 
attempted to measure whether and to what extent top executives’ pay levels are set as a function 
of their contributions to shareholder value. One obvious explanation for the scant empirical 
evidence is that an executive’s contribution to shareholder value is empirically hard to observe, 
let alone identify. We use stock price reactions to exogenous (albeit tragic) events—sudden 
deaths of executives—to identify executives’ perceived contributions to shareholder value, and 
examine the relationship between perceived contribution and pay. The intuition behind this 
approach is that the stock price reaction to sudden deaths equals the expected value of the 
deceased executive’s contribution net of compensation relative to the expected replacement. Our 
methodology extends a line of investigation found in Johnson et al. (1985), who use sudden 
deaths to identify managerial contribution to firm value. Although several recent papers make 
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use of the event of sudden death, no prior studies use the methodology to test whether 
executives are paid for their contribution to shareholder value along the lines we propose.   
We collect data on the events of the sudden deaths of 149 top executives in the U.S. 
between 1991 and 2008. We examine the relationship between executives’ perceived contribution 
to shareholder value measured by the stock price reaction to sudden death and abnormal 
compensation. Abnormal pay is measured as the deceased executive’s actual compensation 
minus the expected compensation of the replacement. We focus on abnormal compensation 
because the stock price reaction reflects the difference between the deceased’s and the 
replacement’s perceived contributions to shareholder value net of pay. The replacement’s 
expected pay is estimated from a regression of total compensation on firm size, year, and 
industry effects; while the deceased’s abnormal pay is the residual from this regression. We infer 
the fraction of the rent captured by executives from a regression of stock price reaction to 
sudden death on the deceased executives’ expected abnormal compensation.1  
Our analysis reveals a negative and significant relationship between the stock price reaction 
to sudden deaths and the deceased executive’s expected abnormal compensation. Thus, 
executives who receive large compensation are perceived to be more valuable to shareholders. 
The relationship is stronger for professional executives and for executives at the top of the 
distribution of pay, which is consistent with a labor market driven by rare managerial talent.  
From the relationship between perceived contribution to value and expected abnormal 
compensation, we elicit an estimate of how rent is shared between executives and shareholders. 
Our estimate indicates that an average top executive keeps 71% of the marginal rent. The 
estimate of the executive’s fraction of rent has a 95% confidence interval from 59% to 88%. We 
estimate that an average CEO keeps 65% of the rent and from 52% to 85% of the rent with a 
                                                 
1  Expected abnormal compensation equals abnormal compensation multiplied by expected 
tenure and scaled by market capitalization. In a previous version of the paper, we obtain similar results 
when we analyze the relationship between total compensation and stock price reaction. Section III. A 
provides the rationale for the use of abnormal compensation.  
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95% confidence interval. The relationship between top executives’ abnormal pay and 
contribution varies with individual, firm, and industry characteristics.  
The relationship between perceived contribution to value and expected abnormal 
compensation is also informative about the variation in the magnitude of surpluses executives 
bring to firms. This question is interesting because it sheds light on whether executives matter 
for value creation. Our approach suggests that the standard deviation on differences in skills 
across executives equals 5.6% of firm value, and ranges from 5.1% to 6.4% with a 95% 
confidence interval. The estimate is upward biased because our method attributes all variation in 
abnormal returns around sudden deaths to differences in skills across executives. Thus, the 5.6% 
estimate is an upper bound on how much executives matter. In comparison, Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003) estimate manager-specific fixed effects in annual profitability and find a 7% 
standard deviation in fixed effects across managers. Taylor (2010, 2013) use structural models 
and find standard deviations in prior beliefs about managers’ effect on profitability of 2.4% and 
4.1% of assets, respectively. Our estimate of the standard deviation of differences in skills across 
executives of 5.6% indicates that executives do matter for firm value.  
Our estimates of how rent is shared are remarkably consistent across empirical 
specifications. The fraction of rent to executives varies from 68.6% to 73.3% when we alter the 
control variables and the measure of compensation. At first glance, our estimate of rent sharing 
appears large. However, our estimate of rent sharing is lower than expected under the skimming 
view on executive pay, according to which powerful CEOs receive more than 100% of the 
marginal rent from the firm-manager relationship. Our estimate of rent sharing is more in line 
with the literature on optimal contracting (Gabaix and Landier, 2008), according to which the 
executive receives a fraction of the marginal rent. Moreover, our estimate of rent sharing is 
positively affected by a significant fraction of executives who are overpaid. In fact 42% (63 out 
of 149) of all executives have positive stock price reactions and thus receive more than 100% of 
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the total rents. As a result, the average rent sharing between executives and shareholders deviates 
from an equal sharing rule. 
Our approach of eliciting rent sharing from the estimated relationship between perceived 
contribution to value and abnormal compensation is attractive because other potential 
determinants of stock price reaction to sudden deaths—such as search costs, succession plans, 
and uncertainty—will only affect the estimated rent sharing if they correlate with expected 
abnormal compensation for reasons that are unrelated to the bargaining process. A priori search 
costs and replacement costs will positively affect compensation because they increase the 
bargaining power of the executive vis-à-vis the board. In such cases, our approach will correctly 
find that executives receive a larger fraction of rent because of higher bargaining power. Overall, 
we note that the stability of the estimated rent sharing across empirical specifications bolsters our 
approach of eliciting an estimate of rent sharing from the relationship between stock price 
reactions to sudden deaths and executive compensation.  
Our study contributes to the literature on executive compensation and the ongoing 
discussion about the level of executive pay along several lines. First, it joins a growing literature 
that addresses the challenging question of whether and how rent from the firm-manager 
relationship is shared between executives and shareholders (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 
2008; Alder 2009; and Taylor, 2013). These studies find varying results. For example, Gabaix and 
Landier (2008) calibrate an assignment model between firm size and executive ability and find 
that CEOs capture only 2% of the value they create. Tervio (2008) finds that CEOs capture 
roughly 20% of the value they add to their firms. Alder (2009) relaxes the Gabaix and Landier 
(2008) assumption of a unity elasticity of substitution between firm quality and executive ability, 
and finds that CEOs might capture greater rent than the amount that Gabaix and Landier (2008) 
and Tervio (2008) suggest. In contrast, Taylor (2013) uses a structural model and finds that the 
surplus from learning is split equally between the executive and shareholders when news about 
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CEO ability is good, and that the CEO completely avoids the negative surplus resulting from 
bad news.   
In comparison to the related papers that measure how surpluses are split and find varying 
results, our empirical strategy uses stock price reactions to sudden death to measure the expected 
contribution to shareholder value. The main advantage of this approach is that it offers clean 
identification of executive contributions and does not rely on the strong assumptions of a full 
structural model. Second, the estimated relationship between executive contributions and 
compensations is informative for the ongoing discussion of the level of executive compensation. 
A large body of literature argues that executive compensation is excessive. But, without a 
measure of executives’ perceived contribution to shareholder value, an assessment of whether 
executive compensation is excessive is difficult. Our study contributes to this ongoing discussion 
by comparing a measure of executives’ contribution to value to their level of pay. One potential 
caveat with our approach is that we rely on market perceptions of managerial contributions to 
shareholder value. To the extent that market perception differs from true value, our contribution 
is in showing that boards pay more to executives whom they think are better. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a survey of prior literature on executive 
compensation. Section II describes the data.  Section III presents the results. Section IV provides 
further evidence for the interpretation. Section V reports robustness checks. Section VI 
concludes. 
I. Prior literature on executive compensation 
In theory, executive pay should be designed by the board to maximize shareholder value. 
Optimal contracting assumes that boards bargain at arm’s length with executives over their pay. 
However, executive compensation remains a controversial topic, as proponents of the 
“skimming view” argue that some empirical facts about pay appear to contradict theoretical 
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predictions of optimal contracting. Prior literature has discussed the level and structure of 
executive pay intensively, resulting in three dominant views. 
The first strand of literature studies the pay-to-performance sensitivity. Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) show that CEO wealth is only weakly related to firm performance. An increase of one 
thousand dollars in firm value leads to an average increase in CEO wealth of only three dollars. 
Subsequent literature provides abundant evidence of a significant increase in CEO pay in both 
absolute and relative terms since 1990. This increase is largely attributed to an increase in the 
equity and stock option component of pay, which is consistent with a better alignment of 
interest between managers and shareholders (Murphy, 1999; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; 
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 
2010; Frydman and Saks, 2010; and Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2011, among others). 
Another important strand of literature explains the level and the functional form of pay as 
“skimming” issues. Differences in pay are, in part, attributed to entrenchment, luck, and change 
in social norms relating to pay (Yermack, 1997; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2008; and Kuhnen and Niessen, 2012, among others). 
According to this view, top executives have, to some extent, power and leverage to set their own 
pay. In particular, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) point out that many facets of compensation can be 
better explained as governance issues than as optimal contracting outcomes.  
A third strand of the literature attributes the recent increase in the level of pay to changes 
in the nature and risk of the CEO’s job. Gabaix and Landier (2008) show that, if we attribute the 
pay rise only to agency problems, an average U.S. CEO might steal 80% of his/her pay, which is 
implausible. Among the explanations for the recent pay rises are: increasing competition for 
managerial talent—both domestically and internationally (Lucas, 1978; Rosen, 1981, 1982; 
Frydman, 2005; Murphy and Zábojnik, 2007; Terviö, 2008; and Marin and Verdier, 2012); 
increasing firm size (Gabaix and Landier, 2008); increasing firm complexity (Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2006); use of peer group in compensation (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen, 2008; and 
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Hayes and Schaefer, 2009); new managerial technologies (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; 
Giannetti, 2011); and tighter governance regimes (Peters and Wagner, 2014). More recently,   
Fernandes et al. (2013) shed light on the increase in the level of executive pay by comparing the 
U.S. against 14 countries with mandated pay disclosures. They show that U.S. and non-U.S. 
CEO pay has largely converged in the 2000s. 
Despite a rich literature on executive compensation, direct empirical evidence on whether 
and to what extent pay reflects executives’ contribution to shareholder value is scant (Frydman 
and Jenter, 2010). Our paper draws inspiration from a growing body of literature that uses 
sudden deaths to overcome the identification issues related to the contribution of top executives 
to shareholder value. In a seminal paper, Johnson et al. (1985) use sudden deaths of 53 
executives to estimate the value of executives' continued employment. They find positive stock 
price reaction to the death of founder-CEOs and negative reaction to that of professional CEOs.  
Later papers have applied this approach to examining the value of various CEO characteristics 
(Worrell et al., 1986; Slovin and Sushka, 1993; Borokhovich et al., 2006; and Salas, 2010). 
Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon (2007) study the event of the deaths of CEOs, and 
of their relatives, and show that CEOs are instrumental for corporate performance. More 
recently, Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) use sudden deaths to estimate the value of independent 
directors. 
Our paper is similar in spirit to two recent papers. First, it shares with Chang, Dasgupta, 
and Hilary (2010) a focus on the event of CEO turnovers, showing that the stock market reacts 
negatively when highly paid CEOs leave. Second, Taylor (2013) provides a dynamic learning 
model in which shareholders update their beliefs about CEO ability through past stock price 
performance and adjust pay accordingly. Taylor (2013) finds that the average CEO captures 
approximately half of surpluses from good news, and bears none of the negative surplus from 
bad news. In contrast to Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2010) and Taylor (2013), this study uses 
stock price reactions to sudden deaths to examine whether executives are paid for their 
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contribution to shareholder value; it then uses this relationship to elicit an estimate of how rent is 
shared between executives and shareholders. The main advantages of our experiment are that 
deaths are exogenous, unlike the turnover events in Chang et al. (2010), and that our method 
does not require the strong assumptions of a structural model, as do the models of Gabaix and 
Landier (2008), Terviö (2008), Alder (2009), and Taylor (2013). 
II. Sample and data 
A. Sample selection and definition of sudden deaths 
The sample consists of 149 sudden deaths of top executives between January 1, 1991 and 
December 31, 2008. A gross sample of 520 deceased top executives of firms listed on AMEX, 
NASDAQ, and NYSE was identified by searching Factiva, Lexis-Nexis, and Edgar Online, using 
keyword search terms for executives (CEO, president, chairman, executive, etc.) and for death 
(passed away, died, deceased, etc.). Among these we then identify sudden deaths by classifying 
the causes of death. Our sample of 149 executive deaths was identified from more than 10,000 
newspaper articles and more than 2,000 corporate filings to the SEC related to executive 
changes. Using the same keywords on a search on the SEC filings, we find that death events 
from the news are also reported in the SEC filings and vice versa. This alleviates the concern that 
news coverage of sudden deaths is skewed toward eventful executives with large stock price 
reactions, because all firms are required to file changes in executive positions with the SEC. 
Identifying the value of the services provided by executives requires that the deaths be 
sudden and unanticipated by the stock market. Given that we identify a gross sample of deceased 
executives, we attempt to apply a medical definition of sudden deaths whenever possible. Among 
natural deaths (deaths caused by diseases), we include heart attack and stroke, as well as cases in 
which the cause is unknown but the death is described as sudden and unexpected, with an 
absence of news about declining health prior to the death. Among unnatural deaths, we include 
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accidents and traumatic deaths but exclude suicides, because such cases might relate to the 
current situation surrounding the firm.2 
Our ability to follow such a stringent medical definition is obviously limited by our use of 
newspaper articles to classify causes of death. We therefore verify causation by conducting 
additional searches for news containing the name of the executive. In cases of inconsistency in 
the reported cause of death across various sources, we conservatively do not classify the death as 
sudden. As a result, deaths caused by heart attack, for example, are only classified as sudden if we 
cannot find any evidence of a prior history of heart problems or declining health. 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the causes of death. Out of the 520 deceased executives in our 
gross sample, 149 (28.7%) of the deaths were sudden. Of the remaining decedents, 143 
executives died of cancer; 55 died from various diseases; 13 died from complications related to 
surgery; 6 committed suicide; and 78 were reported to have died from unspecified illnesses, while 
the cause of death is unknown for the remaining 76 cases. 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the most common cause of sudden death is heart attack (72 
cases), followed by accidents (25 cases), and strokes (10 cases). Finally, 42 deaths are described in 
the news as sudden and unexpected without specific details given about the cause of death. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the position of the suddenly deceased executives. Out of the 
total sample of 149 executives, 81 are CEOs; 28, executive presidents or chairmen; and 40, 
CFOs, COOs, or vice presidents. 
For the sample of sudden deaths, the death date and the earliest news date were verified by 
an additional search of news containing the name of the executive. The average (median) time 
lag between death and news dates is 1.3 calendar days (1 day). Our sample includes one extreme 
case in which a firm held back the announcement for 12 days. Otherwise, the delay is mainly 
                                                 
2 Our definition of sudden deaths is similar to those in Johnson et al. (1985) and Nguyen and 
Nielsen (2010). 
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caused by intervening weekends. Thus, the average time lag between death and news dates is 
0.76 trading days, and 86.6% of all firms reported within one trading day.  
We also check the possibility of confounding news surrounding the event. Whenever 
important corporate news occurs from day -1 to day +1 around the news date, the events are 
eliminated from the sample. Examples of confounding news include quarterly earnings, merger, 
acquisitions or asset sales, major strike, drug development or patent grant, and stock repurchases. 
A special case is the cancellation of the pending merger between Danielson Holding Corp. and 
Midland Financial Group, because presidents of both companies died in the same plane crash. In 
two cases, multiple executives from the same company were involved in the same fatal accident.3 
Executives from these special cases are excluded from the final sample because we cannot 
identify the value of each individual. Finally, six cases of deaths related to firms with market 
capitalizations of less than $10 million. To alleviate potential bias from these extremely small 
firms, we excluded them from the analysis. Our final sample, therefore, includes 149 executives. 
B. Executive compensation 
Existing studies of executive compensation rely mainly on S&P 1500 firms that are covered 
by the ExecuComp database. Because sudden deaths of top executives provide a close to 
random draw of U.S. listed firms, we cannot rely exclusively on compensation data from 
ExecuComp. A large number of firms and executives in our sample are simply not covered by 
ExecuComp. 4  In keeping with existing literature, we therefore follow ExecuComp’s data 
procedures and calculate total annual compensation (tdc1 variable in Execucomp) using 
information in SEC Def14a filings.  
For most compensation items, we can directly observe the dollar value from the SEC 
filings. For options, we calculate the Black-Scholes value, using dividend yield and volatility data 
                                                 
3 Bruno’s Inc. suffered a devastating loss of five executives when its corporate jet crashed on 
December 11, 1991, and Agco Corp. lost its president and vice president when a private jet crashed on 
January 4, 2002. 
4 Out of 149 firms in our sample 44 firms (29.5%) are included in the ExecuComp database. 
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from Compustat. To assess the accuracy of our ability to follow ExecuComp’s procedures, we 
check the consistency of the data with the information provided by ExecuComp for S&P 1500 
firms in our sample. Generally, our estimates exactly match the values reported in ExecuComp. 
In the few cases showing a discrepancy, our estimates are very close to ExecuComp values. 
Thus, our measures of executive compensation are identical to those in prior literature.5  
C. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of deceased top executives. Panel A 
reports individual characteristics. The average (median) age is 59.0 (58.0) years for all executives 
and 59.4 years (60 years) for CEOs. A substantial variation exists in executive age, with a range at 
the time of death from 38 to 91 years, and 98.7% of our executives are male.  
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
Panel B of Table 2 reports firm characteristics. The average firm in our sample has $1.5 
billion in market capitalization, has a market-to-book ratio of assets of 2.4, and is 36.6 years old.  
Panel C shows statistics on executive compensation. Total compensation averages 
$1,102,200 ($273,700 in salary; $162,800 in bonus; $352,000 in option and restricted stock; and 
$313,700 in other forms) with a median of $456,700. The average CEO was compensated with 
$1,424,400, whereas other executives received, on average, $718,500. In comparison, the average 
(median) executive in the ExecuComp universe, for instance, receives $2,128,200 ($940,300) in 
total compensation. At the same time, the average (median) S&P 1500 firm has market 
capitalization of $7.2 billion ($1.5 billion)—larger than our event firms. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, executives receive lower pay in our sample of listed firms in the United States.  
                                                 
5 In 2006 the proxy statement disclosure rules changed due to new SEC’s requirements. As a 
result, the definition of tdc1 in ExecuComp changes at that time. For all executives in our sample, we 
compute pay and value option directly from proxy statements, using ExecuComp’s method before 2006. 
The 2006 change in reporting requirements, therefore, does not contaminate our results because the 
compensation of the executives in our sample are computed consistently using the same method. The 
correlation between our measure of total compensation and the tdc1 variable in ExecuComp (before the 
2006 change) is 0.99. 
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Panel D reports expected remaining tenure of executives in our sample based on a one-
year turnover probability model and a half-life model. Following Huson, Parrino, and Starks 
(2001), we first estimate a probit model of the one-year turnover probability in the ExecuComp 
universe, controlling for indicators on executive age, total annual compensation, return on assets, 
and industry and year effects. Expected remaining tenure is calculated as the inverse of the 
predicted turnover probability from this model. An average executive in our sample is expected 
to hold office for 5.35 years. CEOs are expected to stay for 5.17 years, and other executives for 
5.58 years. In comparison to Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), our estimate of expected 
remaining tenure is lower. We attribute part of this difference to the fact that executive turnover 
has recently increased (Peters and Wagner, 2014). 
One potential problem with using one-year turnover frequencies to estimate expected 
remaining tenure is that turnover tends to spike around the retirement ages of 65 and 70. For 
example, if retirement spikes around age 65, executives of age 63 might have a low one-year, but 
a high two-year, turnover probability. In such a case, we overestimate expected remaining tenure 
when using a one-year turnover probability. To address this issue, we construct a half-life 
estimate of expected remaining tenure. For each executive, we estimate the number of years it 
takes for the predicted cumulative turnover probability to reach 0.5. This estimate is then 
doubled to obtain a half-life estimate of expected remaining tenure. The half-life estimate will 
thus capture spikes in the turnover probability for executives that are close to retirement but not 
expected to retire within the next year. The half-life estimation yields an average expected 
remaining tenure of 6.60 years (6.19 years for CEOs and 7.09 years for other executives), which 
is slightly larger than the one-year turnover probability model.  
D. Stock price reactions to sudden deaths 
Stock price reactions to sudden deaths of executives should reflect the expected 
incremental value of cash flows under the deceased executive net of this pay, relative to the 
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expected incremental value of the replacement net of his pay. In addition, the firm may incur 
replacement and search costs, which will affect stock price reactions negatively. 
To measure the stock price reaction to sudden deaths, we access daily returns from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for an eleven-trading-day period around the death. 
The event day is defined as the trading day of the executive's death or the first trading day 
following the death, if it occurred on a non-trading day. To calculate the abnormal return, we 
assume a single-factor model, where beta is estimated using the data from the pre-event window. 
We obtain similar results if we alternatively use market-adjusted returns. 
Panel A in Table 3 presents the time series of abnormal returns around the death date. On 
average, a small and negative share price adjustment is associated with the unexpected loss of 
executives. In particular, the stock price reaction is negative for three straight days, from trading 
day -1 to +1. This pattern suggests that deaths are incorporated into market prices in the period 
from the death until the event becomes publicly known to market participants. We also observe 
that stock reactions, on average, become positive from day +2 to +3, which tend to be the days 
during which the firms nominate the interim executive or replacement. 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
In Panel B, we report the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the two-, three-, 
and four-day event windows from trading day -1 to 0, -1 to +1, and -1 to +2, respectively (day 0 
is the death date or the first trading day after the death). We note that the CARs are negative, but 
statistically insignificant.6 
In general, our analysis will use the event window from -1 to +1 around the death date.7 
This approach is motivated by two observations. First, our definition of sudden death allows for 
a 24-hour time interval from the change in the prior clinical state until sudden death. Our sample 
                                                 
6 Throughout the analysis event windows will refer to trading days around the death date where 
day 0 is the death date or the first trading day after the death. 
7 In a robustness check in Section V, we propose alternative event windows, including one 
anchored around the news date. Our results are not affected in any meaningful way by the definition of 
the event date. 
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includes cases in which the media reports that an executive has been hospitalized due to an 
accident on day -1, resulting in death the following day. Second, on average, the time lag between 
death and news dates is short (0.76 trading day).  
The cumulative abnormal return provides an estimate of the average executive’s perceived 
contribution to shareholder value relative to his/her expected replacement, which, according to 
our methodology, equals 1.22%. The estimate has a 95% confidence interval from -2.63% to 
0.19% and is not statistically different from zero. When compared to prior literature, our average 
stock price reaction of -1.22% differs. Johnson et al. (1985) find an increase in the stock price of  
3.5% following the sudden deaths of founder CEOs, compared to a decrease of -1.16% 
following those of non-founder CEOs. Hayes and Schaefer (1999) and Salas (2010) find positive 
CARs of 2.84% and 0.9%, respectively. In comparison, our sample covers a more recent time 
period with fewer founders (21.4% in our sample versus 31.9% and 27.7% in Johnson et al. 
1985; and Salas 2010, respectively). In addition, our study includes other top executives, rather 
than focusing exclusively on CEOs.  
Finally, Panel C of Table 3 reports the cumulative abnormal return in the months leading 
up to the sudden death to verify that the deaths are unexpected and unrelated to firm 
performance. We note that the abnormal stock returns are not systematically different from zero 
prior to the sudden death.  
 
III. Are executives paid for their contribution to shareholder value?  
In this section, we first relate the stock return in the period coincident with the sudden 
death of executives to their expected abnormal compensation. Second, we use the estimated 
relationship to elicit how rent from the firm-manager relationship is split between shareholders 
and executives. Third, we examine the cross-sectional variation in the relationship between 
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executive contributions and abnormal pay to corroborate the interpretation of the relationship as 
driven by executive talent. 
 
A. Executives’ contributions to shareholder value and their pay 
We examine the relationship between executives’ perceived contribution to shareholders 
value measured by the stock price reaction to sudden death and expected abnormal 
compensation: 
 
CARi = β*Expected abnormal compensationi + εi. (1) 
 
Expected abnormal compensation is measured as the deceased executive’s actual 
compensation minus the expected compensation of the replacement. We focus on abnormal 
compensation because the stock price reaction reflects the difference between the deceased’s and 
the replacement’s perceived contributions to shareholder value net of pay. 
We follow prior literature and estimate abnormal compensation by decomposing pay into 
market and abnormal pay (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Murphy, 1999; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004). Abnormal pay is the difference between the actual and predicted total annual 
compensation. We use data from Execucomp to predict total annual compensation using a 
model that regresses total annual compensation on logarithm of book value of assets, industry, 
and time effects.8 The estimated residual—actual pay minus predicted pay—measures abnormal 
pay, while market pay is the expected pay of the replacement. To measure the perceived 
contribution to shareholder value and expected abnormal compensation in the same unit 
(percentage of firm value), we scale expected abnormal compensation by market capitalization. 
                                                 
8 Our results are robust to including a wider set of firm characteristics in the compensation 
model. 
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To capture the total expected abnormal compensation, we multiply the annual abnormal 
compensation with the expected remaining tenure.  
If the marginal rent from the firm-manager relationship is shared between shareholders 
and executives, we expect a negative correlation between expected abnormal compensation and 
stock price reactions because executives with large abnormal compensation are perceived to be 
more valuable to shareholders. If executive pay exceeds the marginal contribution relative to the 
replacement, we expect, because of entrenchment, a positive correlation between stock price 
reactions and expected abnormal compensation. 
Table 4 relates the value of executives’ continued service to their expected abnormal pay. 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for all top executives, CEOs, and other top executives, 
respectively. We observe large variations in the stock price reaction to sudden deaths. Although 
the average CAR is negative, 63 out of 149 events are associated with positive CARs. More 
interestingly, the level of expected pay is lower in firms with positive CARs. Current 
compensation of executives with positive CARs is equal to 0.5% of firm value, as compared to 
0.69% of firm value for executives with negative CARs.  
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
We find a similar pattern once we multiply current compensation with expected remaining 
tenure to estimate the expected compensation; expected compensation equals 2.58% of firm 
value for executives with positive CARs, as compared to 3.25% of firm value for executives with 
negative CARs. The difference in total compensation is driven by abnormal compensation. 
Executives with negative CARs expected abnormal compensation of 1.42% compared to 0.61% 
for executives with positive CARs. When we focus on CEOs, an identical picture emerges. 
CEOs with positive CARs are expected to receive lower compensation than CEOs with negative 
CARs. Indeed, we find that CEOs with positive (negative) CARs receive a total expected 
compensation of 2.43% (4.34%) of firm value and a total expected abnormal pay of 0.48% 
(2.36%) of firm value, respectively. 
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In Panel B we regress stock price reactions on expected abnormal compensation. The 
regression includes an intercept that is not statistically different from zero.9 In Column 1, we find 
a negative correlation between expected abnormal pay and stock returns. Column 2 shows that 
the estimated coefficients on the CEOs are larger than the coefficient of the average executive in 
the pooled sample. The negative correlation in Column 1 is thus driven by the CEOs. If the 
negative correlation is related to rent sharing, we expect the negative correlation to be driven by 
the subsample of executives with negative stock price reactions. On the other hand, if managers 
take away more than they contribute, we expect a positive correlation between the stock price 
reaction and expected abnormal compensation among firms with a positive stock price reaction. 
To bolster the interpretation of the empirical evidence, we therefore split the sample according 
to the sign of the cumulative abnormal return. In Column 3, we find a positive correlation 
between expected abnormal compensation and contribution to shareholder value for executives 
with positive CARs, while Column 4 shows a negative and significant correlation between CARs 
and expected abnormal compensation for executives with negative stock price reactions. 
Columns 5 and 6 show correlations between CARs and abnormal compensation when we use 
the half-life estimate of expected remaining tenure instead. Since estimated remaining tenure 
from half-life models are generally larger than estimated remaining tenure, estimated coefficients 
from columns 5 and 6 are slightly smaller than coefficients from columns 1 and 2. In relation to 
expected remaining tenure, we emphasize that the estimated correlations between stock price 
reactions and compensation are not an artifact of the interaction between compensation and 
expected remaining tenure. All coefficients in Panel B of Table 4 have the same sign and 
statistical significance if we alternatively regress stock price reactions on actual abnormal 
compensation.  
                                                 
9  Note that Equation 1 suggests that the model should not include an intercept or that, 
alternatively, the intercept is zero. Consistently, we find that the intercept is statistically insignificant. We 
find (almost) identical results when we exclude the intercept. 
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Because total rent from the firm-manager relationship is divided between shareholders and 
the manager, we can elicit how surplus from the firm-manager relationship is shared between 
executives and shareholders. To illustrate this inference, suppose that manager i produces πi of 
value per year. Shareholders capture a fraction θ of the rent from the firm-manager relationship. 
The manager’s compensation is then wi = (1- θ)πi, while shareholders keep θπi  per year. If the 
firm-manager relationship is terminated, the firm will hire a replacement r who produces πr of 
value per year. Thus, the stock market reaction to the sudden death of manager i depends on the 
difference between the deceased manager’s and the replacement’s perceived contribution to 
shareholder value and the expected remaining tenure E[τ] of the deceased: 
 
CARi = -θ(πi-πr)E[τ] (2) 
 
In Equation 1, the coefficient β relates the stock price reaction, CARi, to the expected 
abnormal compensation. Expected abnormal compensation equals (1-θ)(πi-πr)E[t], which is the 
difference between the compensation of manager i and his replacement r during the expected 
remaining tenure E[t]. Substituting CARi and expected abnormal compensation into Equation 1 
yields: 
CARi 
-θ(πi-πr)E[τ] 
= 
= 
β*Expected abnormal compensationi + εi. 
 
β(1-θ)(πi-πr)E[t]) + εi. 
 
Taking expectations and dividing, we obtain 

 

1
ˆ  

 ˆ1
ˆ

 . 
 
 
 
(3) 
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Thus, given the estimated relationship between contribution to shareholder value and expected 
abnormal compensation, ˆ , we can elicit the fraction of rent to shareholders, θ, and the fraction 
of rent to executives, (1-θ). 
Following Equation 3, the estimated coefficient of -0.408 in Column 1 of Table 4 implies 
that for each dollar of surplus created, the executive keeps 71 cents, while shareholders obtain 29 
cents. The 95% confidence interval suggests an estimated range of the shareholders fraction of 
rent from 12% to 41%. Column 2 reports the results for the subsample of CEOs. We note that 
shareholders’ fraction of surplus from CEOs is slightly higher. Table 4 also shows that, in our 
sample, 58% of firms have negative stock price reactions and are thus paying the executive a 
fraction of his contribution consistent with the optimal contracting view on executive pay (e.g., 
Gabaix and Landier 2008). Meanwhile, the remaining 42% of executives with positive stock price 
reactions appear to be paid more than their perceived contribution, which is consistent with the 
skimming view of executive compensation (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Our estimate of the 
average rent sharing of 71% reflects the coexistence of both views. 
Our approach also allows us to infer the magnitude of surpluses that executives bring to 
their firms. Differences in skills across CEOs, (πi-πr), can be elicited from the stock price 
reactions given our estimate of rent sharing, θ, and expected tenure, E[τ]. For instance, if we 
assume E[τ] is constant, we can calculate the variance in skills across executives from Equation 
2:  
Var     

 
i
ri
CARVar
tE
Var 1  
(4) 
 
Using a Taylor approximation and average expected tenure of 5.35 yields a standard 
deviation of differences in skills across executives of 5.6% of firm value with a 95% confidence 
interval from 5.1% to 6.4%.10 The estimate is upward biased because our method attributes all 
                                                 
10 Confidence intervals are calculated assuming a normal distribution. 
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variation in abnormal returns around sudden deaths to differences in skills across executives.  
Thus, the 5.6% estimate is an upper bound on how much executives matter. In comparison, 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) estimate manager-specific fixed effects in annual profitability and 
find a 7% standard deviation in fixed effects across managers. Taylor (2010, 2013) use structural 
models and find standard deviations in prior beliefs about managers’ effect on profitability of 
2.4% and 4.1% of assets, respectively. Our estimate of the standard deviation of differences in 
skills across executives of 5.6% indicates that executive talent matters for firm value.  
In the following sections, we address concerns about whether our estimate of rent sharing 
is confounded by search costs, the expected replacement, and the possibility that sudden deaths 
introduce uncertainty about future firm policies. We note that while these confounding effects 
are likely to affect stock price reactions to sudden death, they will only affect our estimated 
relationship between contributions to firm value and pay if they correlate with abnormal 
compensation for reasons that are unrelated to the bargaining process.11 Economically, arguing 
for such a case is difficult. For instance, search costs naturally affect compensation positively, but 
only because these costs increase the bargaining power of the executive vis-à-vis the board. 
One might also be concerned about whether the estimated rent sharing is driven by 
correlation between the compensation of the deceased and the expected replacement. For 
instance, firms might target executives with a particular level of ability (or style). While this 
practice causes the compensation of the deceased and the expected replacement to be positively 
correlated, it also implies that the stock price reactions to sudden deaths should be close to zero 
and uncorrelated with pay. If the deceased executive, on the other hand, had higher ability (or fit 
the desired style better) than the expected replacement, we would expect his abnormal 
compensation to be higher because the higher ability increases his bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
board.  
                                                 
11 Again, note that the correlation between stock price reactions and expected compensation is 
driven by current compensation and not by expected remaining tenure. Search costs and uncertainly 
should therefore be positively correlated with current compensation to explain our results. 
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Even if one is willing to argue that search costs or the compensation of the expected 
replacement are correlated with the deceased’s abnormal compensation, these concerns cannot 
explain why we find different correlations for the subsamples of executives with  positive and 
negative stock price reactions. If the correlation between the deceased’s compensation and 
search costs (or compensation of the expected replacement) is driving the results, one would 
expect to find the same sign on the estimated relationship across these two samples. The 
intuition behind our approach, on the other hand, suggests that executives with positive stock 
price reactions are paid more than they contribute, while executives with negative contributions 
are paid a fraction of the rent from the firm-manager relationship. 
While these arguments are helpful in asserting that our key identifying assumption—that 
frictions in the labor market or in succession planning are uncorrelated with abnormal 
compensation—is satisfied, identifying executive talent rankings is prohibitively difficult. In the 
following, we therefore control for other determinants of executives’ contribution to shareholder 
value and examine the cross-sectional variation in the relationship between contribution and pay. 
Exploring the cross-sectional relationship is helpful in corroborating the interpretation of the 
evidence as being driven by executive talent.  
 
B. Controlling for other determinants of executives’ contributions to shareholder value 
Our analysis, so far, does not take other determinants of stock price reactions to sudden 
death into account. In particular, Johnson et al. (1985) show that founder CEOs differ from 
professional CEOs, while Salas (2010) emphasizes the effect of executive entrenchment. Firms 
might also incur substantial search costs or turnover-related costs when their executive suddenly 
dies. Similarly, uncertainty about future firm policies might negatively affect firm value if 
succession plans are incomplete or no well-qualified replacement currently exists inside the firm. 
To address these concerns, we introduce firm characteristics as control variables:  
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CARi = α + β Expected abnormal compensationi + γ Xi + η. (5) 
 
In this specification, the intercept will capture general search costs and disruption costs due 
to lack of succession planning, while covariates, Xi, allow us to control for executive 
entrenchment and firm characteristics while estimating the sharing rule. We note that the 
intercept in Equation 5 measures the change in the present value (PV) of future search costs as a 
result of the death.  
For the sake of presentation, we only present regression results using expected remaining 
tenure resulting from the one-year turnover probability model, as results from the half-life model 
are qualitatively similar. Our results are reported in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
As reported in Column 1, we find that stock market reactions to CEO deaths appear more 
positive, although the effect is insignificant. Remaining tenure is negative and insignificant. We 
also control for firm characteristics such as firm size (market capitalization), market-to-book 
ratio, returns on assets, stock price volatility, board size, outsider ratio, and staggered board.12 We 
note that few of these control variables are significant. More importantly, the coefficient of 
expected compensation remains negative and significant when individual and firm characteristics 
are taken into account.  
Columns 2, 3, and 4 repeat the regression in Column 1 on the subsamples of CEOs and 
top executives with positive and negative stock reactions, respectively. In Column 2, the 
estimated coefficient of expected compensation is -0.459 and is significant at the 5% level. This 
coefficient is equivalent to an estimated rent share of 68.6% for the CEO against 31.4% for the 
shareholders. Among executives with positive stock reactions, in Column 3 we find a coefficient 
                                                 
12  In unreported regression, we include other corporate governance characteristics, but they 
appear to have little impact on the estimated relationship between stock price reactions and abnormal 
compensation. The results are, thus, robust to expanding the list of corporate governance characteristics 
among the control variables. 
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of expected compensation of 0.502, while Column 4 shows a coefficient equal to -0.469 for 
negative stock price reactions. 
In Column 5 we add controls for search costs. We follow Cremers and Grinstein (2014), 
who argue that hiring and search costs depend on the industry talent pool and the need for firm-
specific human capital. We therefore include the fraction of CEOs in the industry hired from the 
outside (Outside fraction) and the Herfindahl index to capture search costs. The Herfindahl index in 
Table 5 is computed from the distribution of sales across firms in the same industry as the firm 
associated with an executive who died suddenly. The argument of having this index as a proxy 
for the search cost is that in an industry with a greater level of competition, it is easier and less 
costly to find a top executive. Consistent with search costs, we find lower stock price reactions in 
industries where firms tend to hire from the outside. Similarly, we find more negative stock price 
reactions in concentrated industries, where the industry talent pool is smaller.  However, the 
effect is not statistically significant. More importantly, we note that the correlation between 
expected compensation and perceived contribution to shareholder value does not change when 
we add controls for search costs. 
In Column 6 we add indicators for whether the firm has a succession plan or announces 
an interim replacement in the week following the death. We search the firm’s annual reports and 
all corporate disclosure to the SEC 3 years before the deaths, and all the news 3 months after the 
deaths. If any mention shows that the firm has a succession plan, we then code the firm as 
having a succession plan. We note that executive deaths are less disruptive when firms have a 
succession plan, while announcements of interim replacements have a small negative effect. 
Again, we note that our main results are unaffected once we attempt to control for succession 
plans. 
Results from Table 5 confirm the findings from the parsimonious model in Table 4. We 
obtain broadly consistent results on the relationship between executives’ abnormal compensation 
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and their contributions to firm value when including the control variables. The average executive 
appears to retain 68.6% to 73.3% of the rent from the firm-manager relationship.  
 
C. Cross-sectional variation in the relationship between perceived contributions and pay 
We have reported evidence thus far on the average relationship between perceived 
contribution and abnormal pay. In this section, we explore the cross‐sectional variation of the 
relation between CARs and abnormal pay as a function of individual, firm, and industry 
characteristics. The cross-sectional variation is helpful in corroborating the interpretation of the 
correlation between announcement CARs and expected abnormal compensation as based on 
executive talent. Due to our small sample size we do not formally test the differences in the 
correlation between CARs and abnormal pay across individual and firm characteristics. We also 
report the standard deviation on differences in skill across subsamples. Table 6 summarizes our 
results.  
To facilitate the comparison, Specification 1 reports the main results from Column 1 of 
Panel B in Table 4, while Specifications 2 to 9 focus on the correlation between CARs and 
abnormal pay without control variables. 
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
Specification 2 focuses on the subsample of professional executives (i.e., non-founders 
with ownership lower than 5%). If the correlation between contribution and pay is driven by 
talent, we expect to see a stronger correlation for professional executives because founders and 
managers with high ownership might have the power to set their own pay. Consistently, we note 
that the correlation between expected contribution and expected abnormal pay becomes stronger 
when we exclude founders and managers with large ownership. Shareholders enjoy a greater 
share of rent (37.3%) when a firm employs a professional executive. 
Specifications 3 and 4 focus on the distribution of total compensation and incentive 
compensation as a fraction of total compensation, respectively. If the correlation between 
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expected contributions and pay is driven by executive talent, optimal contracting predicts a 
stronger correlation at the top of the distribution of compensation, while the “skimming view” 
would predict the opposite. In specifications 3 and 4, we find stronger correlations for executives 
with compensation above the median and for executives in the top half of the distributions of 
incentive pay, respectively. Our results indicate that shareholders retain 38% (44%) of the rent 
for executives in the top half of the distribution of total compensation (incentive compensation).  
Prior literature on executive compensation has argued that executive age and tenure are 
proxies for executive competence and performance as these executives survive many of the 
board of directors’ reviews (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; and Carter and Lorsch, 2003). As 
executive competence increases the bargaining power of the executive vis-à-vis the board, we 
expect a stronger correlation between contribution and pay for young executives with low 
tenure. Prior literature has also argued that executive age and tenure proxies for entrenchment 
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). If older executives with long tenure are entrenched, we 
similarly expect a stronger correlation for young executives with low tenure. As these two 
explanations are observationally equivalent, we unfortunately cannot distinguish between them. 
Specifications 5 and 6 report a slightly stronger correlation between perceived contributions and 
pay for executives with age and tenure below their median, respectively.  
In assortative matching models of executive compensation, top talented executives are 
assigned to large firms and enjoy large pay. As a result, pay and talent are positively related to 
firm size. Thus, one might expect to see a stronger correlation at the top of the firm size 
distribution. Our framework, however, scales both expected contribution and pay by firm size 
and, therefore, eliminates the effect of assortative matching. It is still interesting to examine the 
correlation between perceived contribution and pay for large firms. Specification 7 shows that 
for large firms (the ones with above the median market capitalization) the correlation between 
abnormal pay and contribution is lower. 
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We also expect a stronger correlation between expected contributions and pay in industries 
with wide executive talent pools, because wider talent pools lower the bargaining power of the 
executive vis-à-vis the board. In specifications 8 and 9, we follow Cremers and Grinstein (2014) 
and use the fraction of outside hirings in the industry and the level of industry competition as 
proxies for the width of the industry talent pool. As expected, we find a stronger negative 
correlation in firms that operate in industries with above-median outside hiring, and in 
competitive industries (i.e., industries with a low Herfindahl index). Shareholders enjoy a greater 
share of the rent when the board’s bargaining power is stronger.  
In sum, results from Table 6 show that the relationship between top executives’ abnormal 
pay and contribution varies predictably with individual, firm, and industry characteristics in ways 
that are broadly consistent with the intuition of talent models of CEO pay. 
  
IV. Interpretation and limits of estimations  
 
A. Estimation of rent sharing 
Our estimates suggest that the surplus created by the firm-manager relationship is split in 
favor of the executive. On average, top executives (CEOs) appear to retain 71% (65%) of the 
rent. This estimate of rent sharing is positively affected by the fact that 42% (63 out of 149) of all 
executives have positive stock price reactions and thus receive more than 100% of the total 
rents. For instance, if 90% of all shareholders and executives share the rent equally, and the 
remaining 10% of executives, because of entrenchment, are paid twice as much as they 
contribute, then the average executive would receive 65% of the rent from the firm-manager 
relationship. Thus, even if a small fraction of executives are overpaid, the average sharing rule 
might deviate significantly from the equal sharing rule.  
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One caveat related to the interpretation is that our model specifications assume that we are 
counting all of the compensation that executives earn. Our pay measures are based on SEC 
disclosure rules. Before 2006, only incomplete disclosures about perks, and no disclosure about 
deferred compensation and pensions, were released. To the extent that SEC disclosures under-
count executive compensation, managers (CEOS) might capture more than 71% (65%) of the 
rents from the firm-manager relationship. However, for a sample of S&P 1500 firms, Grinstein, 
Weinbaum, and Yehuda (2009) show an average value of perks of $127,200, which represents 
6% of an average executive’s total compensation in ExecuComp.13 Thus, unreported perks are 
unlikely to change our main results.  
B. Contingent payment upon death 
Another potential caveat to our analysis is that the stock price reaction might reflect 
contingent payments upon executive deaths. An example of contingent payment might be, for 
instance, if the employment contract implies that firms have to pay significant incremental 
compensation to the deceased’s estate. The relationship between compensation and perceived 
contribution to shareholder value might be spurious if such contingent payments are a function 
of annual compensation. Unfortunately, before 2007, firms were not obliged by the SEC to 
disclose information on contingent payments to executives in cases of retirement, resignation, or 
death. Thus, we examine executive deaths occurring after the spring of 2007. 
In total, we have 8 events occurring after the new SEC-imposed disclosure requirements. 
In general, we find that contingent payments include deferred cash compensation (pension 
benefits); base-salary balance payments; and options and restricted stocks with immediate vesting 
and shortened exercise. Because deferred benefits are paid out irrespective of the incidence of 
death, and because death moves these payments forward in time, only time value of money 
produces an effect on stock prices, which is arguably very small, or insignificant. Base-salary 
                                                 
13 Our average firm is smaller than the average S&P 1500. More appropriate benchmarks for the 
level of perks are S&P Midcap 400 or SmallCap 600 indices, with total perks equal to $102,900 and 
$44,900, respectively. 
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balance payments refer to a firm’s practice of paying the base salary for the full calendar year— 
continuing after the death. Thus, for the average firm in our sample, this incremental contingent 
payment would amount to six months of base salary, equivalent to $136,900, which is a tiny 
fraction of the average loss of $18.8 million in market capitalization. For options, firms appear to 
allow immediate vesting (7 out of 8 firms in our sample), but shorten the exercise period to a 
maximum of one year after death (3.15 years in Dahiya and Yermack, 2008). This practice will 
change the value of granted options and restricted stocks. Dahiya and Yermack (2008) find that 
these “sunset” provisions reduce the value of equity compensation when managers retire, resign, 
or die, for a sample of S&P 500 firms. Contingent payments related to sunset provisions are thus 
negative. Collectively, no mechanical or significant relationship appears to exist between 
contingent payments and total annual compensation. 
 
V. Alternative specifications and robustness checks 
In this section we provide additional evidence, using alternative specifications of our event 
study. Our robustness analysis focuses on three important issues: a) the event dates, b) our 
sample of sudden deaths, and c) the potential impact of outliers in executive compensation. 
Table 7 summarizes this exercise.  
A. Alternative specifications of the event study 
The focus of our analysis is on the three-day event window, from -1 to +1. As the chosen 
event date specification is simply one among several possibilities, Table 7 reproduces our main 
result from Column 1 in Table 4, using two alternative approaches: Column 1 uses the two-day 
event window surrounding the news announcement date, while Column 2, as in Johnson et al. 
(1985), uses a firm-specific announcement period from the death date to the news date. As 
roughly 75% (95%) of our events have an announcement period of one (two) trading day(s) or 
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less, the announcement period is quite short for the majority of the sample. In both cases we 
obtain similar results. 
B. Age of executives and known cause of death 
Another valid concern relates to the sample selection. To be able to identify the perceived 
contribution to shareholder value, we require deaths to be sudden and unexpected by the market. 
Although our definition of sudden deaths attempts to ensure that this criterion is satisfied, 
executive age implies an increased probability of mortality or retirement. Simply put, a sudden 
death of an eighty-year-old executive is less surprising than the sudden death of a fifty-year-old. 
We address this concern by conducting complementary tests that take age into consideration. We 
first restrict the sample to executives who are aged 65 or under at the time of death in Column 3 
of Table 7. In Column 4, we take the robustness exercise one step further by requiring that we 
know the causes of death. In both cases our results are robust to alternative specifications. 
C. Alternative measures of compensation 
We use the compensation of the year before the death as our main measure of executive 
pay. The possibility remains that this one-year benchmark does not, somehow, represent the 
average pay level. Although our sudden death approach provides us with a random sample of 
executives, we provide further evidence that our results are robust to this specification.  
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 we use average compensation over the last two and three 
years, respectively, in the estimation of expected abnormal compensation. We obtain a 
coefficient of similar magnitude to the estimates in Table 4.  
As we observe large variations in stock price reactions, outliers might affect our estimates. 
In particular, a concern could exist that our sampling procedure leads to an oversampling of 
eventful executive deaths with large stock price reactions due to a bias in the news coverage 
toward such cases. To evaluate this effect, we run a median regression, which minimizes the sum 
of the absolute residuals rather than the sum of the squared residuals, and reduce the bias caused 
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by potential outliers. Column 7 of Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients from the median 
regression, which results in similar estimates. Finally, Column 8 of Table 7 shows that our results 
are robust to including year fixed effects, to rule out the possibility that the results are driven by 
time effects.  
In summary, Table 7 provides evidence that our results are robust to alternative 
specifications of the event study and to our sample selection of sudden and unexpected deaths. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper attempts to investigate whether executive compensation is related to executive 
contributions to shareholder value.  
Compiling a sample of 149 executives who died suddenly in the United States from 1991 
to 2008, we find evidence of positive sorting between perceived contribution to value and 
abnormal pay: managers with higher contribution to shareholder value receive higher 
compensation. We use the estimated relationship to elicit how rent from the firm-manager 
relationship is shared between executives and shareholders. Based on this methodology, we 
estimate that executives (CEOs) retain 71% (65%) of the rent from the firm-manager 
relationship. This fraction appears large, and is subject to debate and discussion. On the one 
hand, this rent share might reflect the prospect of the scarcity of managerial talent. On the other 
hand, as our estimates show, some executives extract more rent than they create. 
Our study joins a growing literature that addresses the challenging question of whether and 
how rent from the firm-manager relationship is shared between executives and shareholders. In 
comparison to prior studies that measure how surpluses are split and find varying results, our 
empirical strategy uses stock price reactions to sudden death to measure the expected 
contribution to shareholder value. The main advantage of this approach is that it offers clean 
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identification of executive contributions and does not rely on the strong assumptions of a full 
structural model.  
Overall, our results are informative for the ongoing discussion of the level of executive 
compensation. A large body of literature argues that executive compensation is excessive. But, 
without a measure of executives’ perceived contribution to shareholder value, an assessment of 
whether executive compensation is excessive is difficult. To this end, our study proposes a novel 
approach to measure executives’ perceived contribution to shareholder value and its relationship 
to pay. 
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Table 1. 
Cause of executive deaths 
 
This table reports the composition of our sample of executives of AMEX-, NASDAQ-, and NYSE-listed 
firms who died suddenly between the dates of January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2008. Based on the 
cause of death cited in newspaper reports of the deaths, Panel A classifies the causes into: cancer; 
complications from specified diseases (other than cancer); complications from surgery; sudden death (accidents, heart 
attack, strokes, and deaths described as sudden and unexpected with no other cause cited); suicide (self-
inflicted gunshots; death from carbon-monoxide poisoning); unspecified illness (cause of death described as 
brief or long illness); and undisclosed (in cases in which no cause is reported but the death is not described 
as sudden or unexpected). Panel B shows the reported cause of death for the subsample of sudden deaths 
from Panel A. Panel C shows the positions held by the suddenly deceased executives. 
 N Share of total 
A. Cause of death 
  
Cancer 143 0.275 
Complications from specified diseases 55 0.106 
Complications from surgery 13 0.025 
Sudden death 149 0.287 
Suicide 6 0.012 
Unspecified illness 78 0.150 
Undisclosed 76 0.146 
  
All 520 1.000 
  
B. Cause of sudden death 
  
Heart attack 72 0.483 
Stroke  10 0.067 
Accident or murder 25 0.168 
Sudden and unexpected death, but unspecified cause 42 0.282 
  
All 149 1.000 
  
C. Position held by suddenly deceased executive  
CEO 81 0.544 
President and Chairmen 28 0.188 
Other executives: CFO, COO, and Vice Presidents 40 0.269 
  
All 149 1.000 
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 Table 2. 
Descriptive characteristics of executives who died suddenly  
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for our sample of executives of AMEX-, NASDAQ-, and NYSE-
listed firms who died suddenly between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2008. We follow a strict 
definition of sudden death from medical literature, which defines sudden death as an unexpected death 
that occurs instantaneously or within a few hours of an abrupt change in the person's previous clinical 
state. We also include accidental and traumatic deaths that are unanticipated by the stock market and 
unrelated to current firm conditions. Panel A reports the following executive characteristics: age 
(measured in years); gender (indicator taking the value one if the executive is male); and tenure (measured 
in years). Panel B shows the following firm characteristics: market capitalization (in millions of $); market-to-
book ratio of assets; and firm age (measured in years). Panel C reports executive compensation in $1,000s: 
salary; bonus; options and restricted stocks; other compensation; and total compensation. Option grants are valued 
using the Black-Scholes formula, following documentation from ExecuComp prior to 2006. Panel D 
reports expected remaining tenure of top executives from a 1-year turnover probability model and from 
a half-life model. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 All Type of Executive 
  CEO 
(1) 
Other  
(2) 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
 
t-stat 
A. Executive characteristics 
Age (years) 59.00 59.44 58.47 0.97 0.55 
Gender (male=1) 0.987 0.988 0.985 0.002 0.12 
Tenure (years) 9.426 9.469 9.375 0.094 0.06 
  
B. Firm characteristics 
Market capitalization (mill. $) 1541.7 1259.6 1877.8 -618.2 -0.82 
Market-to-book ratio 2.364 2.683 1.984 0.698 1.21 
Firm age (years) 36.58 34.42 39.15 -4.73 -0.83 
  
C. Executive compensation (in thousand $) 
Salary 273.7 302.9 239.0 64.0 1.74* 
Bonus 162.8 129.1 203.0 -73.9 -1.23 
Option and restricted stocks 352.0 532.3 137.1 395.2 1.65 
Other compensation 313.7 460.1 139.4 320.7 1.07 
Total compensation 1102.2 1424.4 718.5 705.9 1.54 
      
D. Expected remaining tenure (years)      
1-year turnover probability model 5.35 5.17 5.58 -0.41 -1.55 
Half-life model 6.60 6.19 7.09 -0.89 -2.57** 
  
  
N 149 81 68   
  
38 
Table 3. 
The stock price reaction to sudden death of executives 
 
This table shows the stock price reaction to the sudden death of executives. Panel A shows the mean 
abnormal return for each trading day from five days before the death to five days after. Panel B shows 
the cumulative abnormal return for various event windows surrounding the death date or the first 
trading day following the death. In addition to the mean abnormal return, we report the corresponding 
Patell Z-score and the number of positive and negative stock price reactions. Panel C reports the 
cumulative abnormal return in the months leading up to the sudden death to verify that the deaths are 
unexpected and unrelated to firm performance. Our sample includes executives of AMEX-, NASDAQ-, 
and NYSE-listed firms who died suddenly between the dates of January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2008. 
We follow a strict definition of sudden death from medical literature, which defines sudden death as an 
unexpected death that occurs instantaneously, or within a few hours of an abrupt change in the person's 
previous clinical state. We also include accidental and traumatic deaths that are unanticipated by the 
stock market and unrelated to current firm conditions. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
Trading day / 
Event window 
N Mean 
abnormal 
return 
Patell Z Number of 
Positive: 
Negative 
Median 
return 
Sign rank 
test 
A. Daily abnormal returns 
    
-5 149 0.15 0.505 78:71 0.02 1.288 
-4 149 -0.47 -0.343 69:80 -0.10 -0.190 
-3 149 0.09 -0.768 65:84 -0.21 -0.846 
-2 149 0.23 0.744 71:78 0.06 0.139 
-1 149 -0.17 -0.380 76:73 0.01 0.959 
0 149 -0.74 -0.381 66:83 -0.43 -0.982 
+1 149 -0.32 -0.732 72:77 -0.09 0.303 
+2 149 0.42 1.692** 79:70 0.13 1.452* 
+3 149 0.35 0.122 74:75 -0.07 0.631 
+4 149 0.05 -0.276 69:80 -0.08 -0.190 
+5 149 -0.15 -1.579* 70:79 -0.22 -0.025 
    
B. Cumulative abnormal returns 
(-1,+0) 149 -0.90 -0.538 74:75 -0.04 -0.631 
(-1,+1) 149 -1.22 -0.861 63:86 -0.59 -1.174 
(-1,+2) 149 -0.80 -0.100 67:82 -0.48 -0.518 
   
C. Cumulative abnormal returns prior to death 
(-120;-2) 147 1.54 -0.579 69:78 -2.45 0.050 
(-90;-2) 147 0.56 -0.800 65:82 -2.32 -0.611 
(-60;-2) 147 0.18 -0.734 70:77 -1.12 0.216 
(-30;-2) 147 -0.57 -0.780 68:79 -0.56 -0.115 
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Table 4. 
Executives’ contributions to firm value and their expected compensation 
 
This table shows the relationship between the value of executives’ perceived contributions to shareholder 
value and their expected compensation. Panel A reports descriptive statistics on the executive contribution 
to shareholder value and expected compensation. The contribution to shareholder value is measured by the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the event window from (-1,+1) around the death date. Annual 
compensation is total compensation in the year prior to death scaled by market capitalization. Expected 
compensation is total compensation multiplied by expected remaining tenure, and scaled by market 
capitalization. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, option and stock grants, and other 
compensation that the executive received in the year prior to his death. Expected abnormal compensation is 
abnormal pay multiplied by expected remaining tenure, and scaled by market capitalization.  Abnormal pay is 
calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted total annual compensation from a model that 
takes firm size (log. book value of asset), industry, and time effects into account. Expected remaining tenure 
is estimated using a 1-year turnover probability model in Panel A and a 1-year turnover probability model 
and a half-life model in Panel B (see Section II.C). Panel B shows OLS regressions of the contribution to 
shareholder value on expected abnormal compensation. t-stats are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
A. Descriptive statistics 
  
Sample All CEOs  Others
Stock market reaction Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg.
  
CAR (-1,+1) 4.99 -5.77 6.50 -6.84 3.21 -4.48
Expected remaining tenure (years) 5.36 5.35 5.14 5.19 5.62 5.54
Annual compensation (%) 0.50 0.69 0.53 0.95 0.45 0.39
Expected compensation (%) 2.58 3.25 2.43 4.34 2.76 1.94
Expected abnormal compensation (%) 0.61 1.42 0.48 2.36 0.75 0.28
  
N 63 86 34 47 29 39
  
B. OLS estimation of fraction of rent to shareholders (θ) 
 
Sample All CEOs All All All CEOs
Stock market reaction All All Pos. Neg. All All
Exp. remain. tenure model 1-year 1-year 1-year 1-year Half-life Half-life
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
   
Expected abnormal -0.408*** -0.543*** 0.630** -0.540*** -0.298*** -0.386***
compensation (-2.93) (-2.94) (2.63) (-4.58) (-2.92) (-2.82)
   
Intercept -0.008 -0.004 0.046*** -0.050*** -0.008 -0.005
 (-1.10) (-0.34) (5.75) (-6.95) (-1.12) (-0.42)
   
R-squared 0.055 0.099 0.102 0.200 0.055 0.091
N 149 81 63 86 149 149
   
Rent to shareholders (θ) 0.290 0.352 - - 0.230 0.278
Rent to executives (1-θ) 0.710 0.648 - - 0.770 0.722
   
95% confidence interval on θ  0.12-0.41 0.15-0.48 - - 0.09-0.33 0.10-0.40
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Table 5. 
Executives’ contribution to firm value and their abnormal pay 
 
This table shows the relationship between the value of executives’ contribution and their expected abnormal 
compensation. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in the event window from (-1,+1) around the 
death date. Expected abnormal compensation is abnormal pay multiplied by expected remaining tenure, and scaled by 
market capitalization. Abnormal pay is calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted total annual 
compensation from a model that takes firm size (log. book value of asset), industry, and time effects into account.  
Expected remaining tenure is estimated using a 1-year turnover probability model. Columns 1, 5, and 6 include all 
executives, whereas Column 2 includes CEOs. Columns 3 and 4 include executives with positive and negative stock 
price reactions, respectively.  t-stats are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
Sample All CEOs Pos.
CAR 
Neg.
CAR 
All All
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
   
Expected abnormal compensation -0.365** -0.459** 0.502* -0.469*** -0.447*** -0.374**
 (-2.53) (-2.52) (1.95) (-4.01) (-3.15) (-2.61)
   
CEO 0.011 0.018 0.012 0.007 0.016
 (0.78) (1.16) (0.91) (0.54) (1.04)
Ownership 0.001* 0.001 0.001** -0.001** 0.001* 0.001
 (1.84) (1.63) (2.30) (-2.00) (1.91) (1.61)
Tenure 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
 (0.69) (1.52) (0.15) (0.80) (-0.01) (0.21)
Market capitalization 0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.001
 (0.09) (-0.93) (0.10) (0.90) (-0.30) (0.08)
Market-to-book ratio -0.004* -0.005* 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
 (-1.79) (-1.71) (0.38) (-0.63) (-1.43) (-1.48)
Return on assets 0.022 0.005 -0.133*** 0.035** 0.023 0.025
 (1.07) (0.21) (-2.82) (2.19) (1.14) (1.21)
Volatility -0.003 0.011 -0.008 0.005 -0.003 -0.002
 (-0.27) (0.54) (-0.53) (0.58) (-0.35) (-0.19)
Board size 0.003 0.008* 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
 (1.01) (1.69) (0.60) (1.02) (0.69) (0.78)
Outsider ratio 0.062 0.141** 0.065 0.030 0.065* 0.060
 (1.65) (2.29) (1.42) (0.83) (1.76) (1.60)
Staggered board 0.008 0.022 -0.003 -0.003 0.014 0.006
 (0.54) (1.03) (-0.20) (-0.20) (0.98) (0.44)
Outside hiring fraction  -0.205*** 
  (-2.93) 
Herfindahl index  -0.144 
  (-1.38) 
Succession plan   0.023
   (1.10)
Interim executive   -0.025*
   (-1.66)
Intercept -0.080** -0.136*** -0.035 -0.111*** -0.005 -0.063*
 (-2.47) (-2.76) (-0.86) (-3.53) (-0.13) (-1.90)
   
R-squared 0.211 0.361 0.382 0.462 0.270 0.232
N 149 81 63 86 149 149 
   
Rent to shareholders (θ) 0.267 0.314 - - 0.309 0.272
Rent to executives (1-θ) 0.733 0.686 - - 0.691 0.728 
   
95% conf. interval on θ 0.07-0.39 0.09-0.45 - - 0.14-0.42 0.08-0.40
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Table 6. 
Cross-sectional correlation between executives’ contribution and their abnormal pay   
This table shows the relationship between the value of executives’ contribution and their expected abnormal compensation for subsamples of the data. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in the event window from (-1,+1) around the death date. Expected abnormal compensation is abnormal 
pay multiplied by expected remaining tenure, and scaled by market capitalization. Abnormal pay is calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted 
total annual compensation from a model that takes firm size (log. book value of asset), industry, and time effects into account. Expected remaining tenure is 
estimated using a 1-year turnover probability model. Professional executives exclude founders and executives with more than 5% of the ownership. Incentive pay is the 
fraction of incentive pay (options and restricted stocks) to total compensation. Firm size is measured by book value of assets. Outside hiring is the fraction of 
executives in the industry that are hired from the outside. Industry competition is measured by the Herfindahl index on sales in the industry. Industry competition is 
above median when value of the Herfindahl index is below median. t-stats are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
Sample Expected 
abnormal 
compensation 
Intercept R-square N Rent to share-
holders (θ) 
95% conf. 
interval on θ 
Std. dev. on 
differences in 
skills 
 
1. All executives -0.408*** -0.008 0.055 149 0.290 0.12-0.41 5.6% 
 (-2.93) (-1.10) 
 
2. Professional executives -0.593*** -0.009 0.212 91 0.372 0.26-0.45 3.6% 
 (-4.89) (-1.24)
 
3. Total compensation above median -0.614*** 0.010 0.165 75 0.381 0.23-0.48 4.6% 
 (-3.80) (0.93)
 
4. Incentive pay above median -0.784*** -0.007 0.309 62 0.440 0.32-0.52 3.9% 
 (-5.18) (-0.70)
 
5. Executive age below median -0.510*** -0.024** 0.130 76 0.338 0.17-0.45 4.7% 
 (-3.32) (-2.35)
 
6. Executive tenure below median -0.519*** -0.010 0.109 74 0.342 0.15-0.46 5.5% 
 (-2.97) (-0.88)
 
7. Firm size above median -0.262 0.009 0.033 75 0.208 -0.07-0.37 5.1% 
 (-1.59) (1.26)
 
8. Outside hiring above median -0.950*** -0.027*** 0.224 75 0.487 0.35-0.58 3.7% 
 (-4.59) (-2.81)
 
9. Industry competition above median -0.670*** 0.010 0.179 74 0.401 0.23-0.50 3.9% 
 (-3.96) (1.10)
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Table 7. 
Alternative specifications of event study, compensation, and estimation method 
 
This table shows the relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns to the sudden death of executives and expected abnormal compensation for 
alternative specifications of the event samples and event windows. Column 1 uses the CARs around the news date. Column 2 uses CARs for the period from 
death date (day -1) to the news date. Column 3 reports results on a sub-sample of sudden deaths of executives aged 65 or under at the time of death. Column 
4 reports results on a sub-sample with known causes of death. Columns 5 and 6 use average compensation over the last two and three years, respectively, in 
the estimation of expected abnormal compensation. Column 7 exhibits the results from a median regression on the full sample. Column 8 shows results 
when year fixed effects are included. t-stats are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Event sample All All Age ≤65 Known 
cause 
All All All All 
Event date News Death Death Death Death Death Death Death 
Event window (-1,0) (-1, news 
date) 
(-1,+1) (-1,+1) (-1,+1) (-1,+1) (-1,+1) (-1,+1) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Median 
regression 
OLS 
Compensation period 1 years 1 year 1 year 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 1 year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Expected abnormal  -0.208* -0.412*** -0.416*** -0.513*** -0.535*** -0.473*** -0.309*** -0.339** 
compensation (-1.91) (-3.42) (-2.69 ) (-3.02 ) (-3.67) (-3.62) (-3.89) (-2.24) 
Intercept -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 0.006 0.002 -0.005 -0.009 
 (-1.57) (-1.65) (-1.43) (-1.58) (0.76) (0.26) (-1.15) (-1.19) 
 
 
Year fixed effects  No No No No No No No Yes 
 
R-squared 0.024 0.074 0.058 0.080 0.091 0.082 - - 
N 149 149 119 107 149 149 149 149 
         
Rent to shareholders (θ) 0.172 0.292 0.294 0.339 0.348 0.321 0.236 0.253 
Rent to executives (1-θ) 0.828 0.708 0.706 0.661 0.652 0.679 0.764 0.747 
 
95 % confidence interval on θ -0.01-0.30 0.15-0.39 0.10-0.41 0.15-0.46 0.20-0.45 0.18-0.42 0.13-0.32 0.04-0.39 
 
 
